The Congo’s History of Violence and Exploitation

The following is the second in a series examining the causes and consequences of the widespread use of rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls as a strategy of war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Before going into more detail, however, in discussing the factors that make rape such an effective weapon in the Congo, it is important to first briefly examine the Congo’s history of violence and exploitation in order to better understand the current political and military environment that allows sexual violence to flourish.

Since 1998, approximately five million people have died in the Congo due to fighting, poverty, and disease.[1] It is important to note, however, that violence, bloodshed and exploitation marked Congo’s history long before the recent conflicts, and it is within this context that rampant sexual violence is taking place.

Though the wars themselves began in 1996, the seeds of Congo’s conflicts were sown in the late 19th century when European colonial powers arbitrarily divided Africa for their own benefit at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885. The major powers of Europe demarcated the borders of African countries, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in ways that benefitted the colonizers “with no regard for existing tribal systems and linguistic groups.” These newly drawn borders created problems when they separated families or created nations that forced people together who previously had no contact with one another.[2]

Under the guise of a mission to Christianize and modernize the DRC, King Leopold of Belgium brutally exploited the country and its people in the late 1800s. He forced the civilian population to extract ivory and rubber, punishing anyone who could not meet his quotas with death or mutilation.[3]

The DRC became independent on June 30, 1960. During the five years after independence, chaos and disorder were prevalent throughout the Congo.[4] Mobutu Sese Seko then seized power and gained control of the country through a military coup in November 1965.[5] Though at first the population supported Mobutu because they yearned for peace and order, his rule ultimately ended up being “one of the most corrupt in the region’s history.” He exploited his own country’s resources, committed extrajudicial executions, and massacred civilians.[6] Mobutu also abolished parliament and all political parties except for his own.[7] During his 32 years in power, Mobutu brutally oppressed and exploited the population, collapsed the economy causing extensive poverty throughout the country, and “got extremely wealthy at their expense” as the population struggled with inflation, unemployment, illiteracy, and rapidly increasing infant mortality rates.[8] Though the Congolese elected a new government in 1990, Mobutu and his inner circle continued to control mineral resources, tax revenues, and the banking system until 1997.[9]

Throughout much of Mobutu’s reign, disagreements over land and struggles for power caused frequent clashes in eastern DRC.[10] In 1994, these problems were exacerbated by the Rwandan genocide and the introduction of a regional dimension in the conflict.[11] In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), an armed group led by Tutsis, seized control from extremist Hutus. As a result, over one million refugees, including many high-ranking Interhamwe Hutu militia members who helped orchestrate the genocide, entered eastern Congo.[12] With this influx, fresh rivalries were also introduced into the country:

Indigenous Congolese groups of all stripes organized themselves into Mai Mai forces, and many allied themselves with the defeated Rwandan Hutus…The interests of Paul Kagame's newly empowered Tutsi government in Rwanda converged with those of the Congolese Tutsis. Both sides originally intended merely to protect their kinsfolk, but they quickly started using their military might to seize land or capture political power.[13]

Many of these Hutu refugees eventually formed the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR) and set up camps in North and South Kivu, where they harassed local Congolese Tutsis and launched attacks across the border designed to destabilize Rwanda’s new government.[14] This security threat was the main reason Rwanda invaded the Congo in 1998, but despite their efforts, they could not “eliminate the genocidaires.”[15]

The Congo’s conflicts are quite complicated and involve a large number of national and regional actors. They can however, be divided into two main wars by time period. The first war began in 1996 with the overthrow of Mobutu and the subsequent reign of Laurent Kabila and lasted until 1997; the second war began in 1998 and officially ended in 2003 with the signing of a peace agreement.[16]

In late 1996, a number of Congolese rebel groups called the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), led by Laurent Kabila and with extensive support from Rwanda and Uganda, marched across the country, killing Hutu refugees and Interhamwe on their way to the capital.[17] The AFDL then set up a new government in May 1997, replacing overthrown Dictator Mobutu Sese Seko with Kabila.[18] Laurent Kabila was named the head of the DRC on May 16, 1997.[19]

Due to serious disagreements between his government and former allies, Uganda and Rwanda, including allegations that he would not address their security concerns, Kabila ordered Rwandan soldiers and all other foreign troops out of the Congo in 1998.[20] Rwanda and Uganda again supported Congolese rebel groups including the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) and the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), comprised largely of Congolese Tutsis. Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe supported Kabila.[21] This conflict divided the country into three main areas. The Front de Liberation du Congo (FLC), with the support of Uganda, controlled the north; the RCD, supported by Rwanda, controlled the east; and the Congolese government, with the support of several foreign powers, controlled the south and western areas of the country.[22]

The involvement of neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda transformed the civil war into a regional crisis, pulling in troops from Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe who, like so many plunderers before them, reaped the spoils of war, including massive pillage and rape of human and natural resources.[23]

A ceasefire was signed in July 1999 between several African nations, the MLC, and the RCD.[24] The United Nations deployed a peacekeeping force, MONUC, to help “implement the ceasefire, to oversee the withdrawal of foreign armies and disarm Congolese and foreign rebels.”[25] In 2001, President Laurent Kabila was murdered and succeeded by his son, Joseph, who “adopted a more flexible attitude towards conflict resolution.”[26] In part due to this new approach, most of the troops from Rwanda and Uganda left the DRC by late 2002.[27] The Inter-Congolese Dialogue in December 2002 led to the formation of a transitional government comprised of Joseph Kabila as president, along with four vice-presidents, including the two rebel leaders of the MLC and the RCD.[28]

After the ceasefire and peace agreement in 2002-2003, a process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration began with the support of the international community. During this process, former rebel groups and armed forces were integrated into the new Congolese army called the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC). While some groups mixed smoothly, some battalions, especially those belonging to former Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma, “refused to be integrated with other forces.”[29]

As noted above, a war originally waged over security concerns in the wake of the Rwandan genocide soon evolved into a regional and national war that continues to be fought mainly for control of the Congo’s resources.[30] Even though Rwanda officially withdrew from eastern DRC after the signing of the peace agreement in 2003, part of the Rwandan administration “continued to unofficially provide financial, logistical, and military support to Congolese fighters of Rwandan origin there.”[31]

There are several additional factors that contribute to the continuation of violence. The 1998-2003 war destroyed much of the state’s infrastructure. The judicial system is extremely weak, there is very little rule of law in the east, and small arms are easily accessible throughout most of the country. There is also very little economic development in eastern DRC which means that “belonging to an armed group is one of few profitable occupations.”[32]

In the 2006 presidential run-off election, Joseph Kabila beat Jean-Pierre Bemba, the leader of the MLC.[33] Despite the peace agreement, official end to the conflict in 2003, and national elections, dozens of small wars continue to flare up on a regular basis in eastern DRC involving irregular militias who target unarmed civilians.[34] Pillage and gang rape are common and spread fear through communities.[35] By late 2008, fighting in North Kivu, political unrest, and human rights violations throughout the country continued despite the signing of the Goma peace agreement in January 2008 between rebels loyal to renegade General Laurent Nkunda, the government and the Mai Mai.[36]

According to Amnesty International, fighting persists in eastern DRC because the Congolese government, regional states, and the international community fail to address the root causes of the conflict. These factors include the continued presence of many Congolese and foreign armed groups, ethnic tensions, questions over land ownership and control of mineral and agricultural wealth, and impunity for those who commit human rights abuses and violate international humanitarian law.[37]

Finally, over a decade of war and political and economic crisis “deeply and permanently weakened the authority of the State” and caused the “complete breakdown of the security forces.”[38] This collapse also created a situation where the State has virtually no administrative control over entire regions of the country.[39] The resulting insecurity left civilians unprotected and led to serious human rights violations.[40] This lack of control and accountability are extremely important factors in explaining why the security forces and other armed groups continue to commit acts of severe sexual violence against civilians.

[1] International Rescue Committee, “Crisis Watch: Special Report: Congo,” International Rescue Committee (2007), http://www.theirc.org/special-report/congo-forgotten-crisis.html (accessed May 14, 2009).
[2] Jennifer J. Ziemke, “Countries and their Cultures: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” http://www.everyculture.com/Bo-Co/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo.html (accessed February 19, 2010).
[3] Michael Deibert, “Congo: Between Hope and Despair,” World Policy Journal vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 63. AND Jennifer J. Ziemke, “Countries and their Cultures: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” http://www.everyculture.com/Bo-Co/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo.html (accessed February 19, 2010). AND “Survey: Coping with Conflict.” The Economist vol. 370, no.8358 (January 17, 2004): 8.
[4] Christopher W. Mullins and Dawn L. Rothe, “Gold, Diamonds and Blood: International State-Corporate Crime in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Contemporary Justice Review vol. 11, no. 2 (June 2008): 89.
[5] Michael Deibert, “Congo: Between Hope and Despair,” World Policy Journal vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 63. AND Christopher W. Mullins and Dawn L. Rothe, “Gold, Diamonds and Blood: International State-Corporate Crime in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," Contemporary Justice Review vol. 11, no. 2 (June 2008): 89.
[6] Christopher W. Mullins and Dawn L. Rothe, “Gold, Diamonds and Blood: International State-Corporate Crime in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," Contemporary Justice Review vol. 11, no. 2 (June 2008): 89.
[7] Jennifer J. Ziemke, “Countries and their Cultures: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” http://www.everyculture.com/Bo-Co/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo.html (accessed February 19, 2010).
[8] Michael Deibert, “Congo: Between Hope and Despair,” World Policy Journal vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 63. AND Jennifer J. Ziemke, “Countries and their Cultures: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” http://www.everyculture.com/Bo-Co/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo.html (accessed February 19, 2010).
[9] Christopher W. Mullins and Dawn L. Rothe, “Gold, Diamonds and Blood: International State-Corporate Crime in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," Contemporary Justice Review vol. 11, no. 2 (June 2008): 90.
AND Jennifer J. Ziemke, “Countries and their Cultures: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” http://www.everyculture.com/Bo-Co/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo.html (accessed February 19, 2010).
[10] Severine Autesserre, “The Trouble With Congo: How Local Disputes Fuel Regional Conflict," Foreign Affairs vol.87, no.3 (May/June 2008): 94.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Michael Deibert, “Congo: Between Hope and Despair,” World Policy Journal vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 64. AND Severine Autesserre, “The Trouble With Congo: How Local Disputes Fuel Regional Conflict," Foreign Affairs vol.87, no.3 (May/June 2008): 94.
[13] Severine Autesserre, “The Trouble With Congo: How Local Disputes Fuel Regional Conflict," Foreign Affairs vol.87, no.3 (May/June 2008): 94.
[14] Michael Deibert, “Congo: Between Hope and Despair,” World Policy Journal vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 64. AND Severine Autesserre, “The Trouble With Congo: How Local Disputes Fuel Regional Conflict," Foreign Affairs vol.87, no.3 (May/June 2008): 94. AND Denis M. Tull, “Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War," International Peacekeeping vol. 16, no. 2 (April 2009): 216.
[15] Denis M. Tull, “Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War," International Peacekeeping vol. 16, no. 2 (April 2009): 216.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Michael Deibert, “Congo: Between Hope and Despair,” World Policy Journal vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 64-65.
[18] Wairagala Wakabi, “Sexual Violence Increasing in Democratic Republic of Congo,” The Lancet vol. 371 no. 9606 (January 2008): 15.
[19] Jennifer J. Ziemke, “Countries and their Cultures: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” http://www.everyculture.com/Bo-Co/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo.html (accessed February 19, 2010).
[20] Nadine NP Puechguirbal, “Women and War in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society vol. 28, no. 4 (July 2003): 1271. AND Denis M. Tull, “Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War," International Peacekeeping vol. 16, no. 2 (April 2009): 216.
[21] Denis M. Tull, “Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War," International Peacekeeping vol. 16, no. 2 (April 2009): 216 AND Michael Deibert, “Congo: Between Hope and Despair,” World Policy Journal vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 65.
[22] Nadine NP Puechguirbal, “Women and War in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society vol. 28, no. 4 (July 2003): 1271.
[23] International Alert, “Alert in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” International Alert. http://www.international-alert.org/drc/index.php (accessed May 14, 2009).
[24] “Timeline: Peace Deal Signed in DRC to End Years of Fighting,” Reuters (January 23, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2384461420080123 (accessed April 20, 2010).
[25] Denis M. Tull, “Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War," International Peacekeeping vol. 16, no. 2 (April 2009): 216.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Dylan Hendrickson and Missak Kasongo, “Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Strategic Issues,” Center on International Cooperation, issue no. 4, p. 4.
[30] Severine Autesserre, “The Trouble With Congo: How Local Disputes Fuel Regional Conflict," Foreign Affairs vol.87, no.3 (May/June 2008): 94.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Denis M. Tull, “Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War," International Peacekeeping vol. 16, no. 2 (April 2009): 216.
[34] Denis M. Tull, “Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War, International Peacekeeping vol. 16, no. 2 (April 2009): 217. AND “Survey: Coping with Conflict," The Economist vol.370, no.8358 (January 17, 2004): 8.
[35] “Survey: Coping with Conflict,” The Economist vol.370, no.8358 (January 17, 2004): 8.
[36] Denis M. Tull, “Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War," International Peacekeeping vol. 16, no. 2 (April 2009): 217. AND Human Rights Watch, “DR Congo: Humanitarian Crisis Deepens as Peace Process Falters,” Human Rights Watch (September 25, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/09/25/dr-congo-humanitarian-crisis-deepens-peace-process-falters (accessed April 20, 2010). AND “Timeline: Peace Deal Signed in DRC to End Years of Fighting,” Reuters (January 23, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2384461420080123 (accessed April 20, 2010).
[37] Amnesty International, “Democratic Republic of Congo: North Kivu; No End to War on Women and Children,” Amnesty International Publications (September 29, 2008): 2-3.
[38] Dylan Hendrickson and Missak Kasongo, “Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Strategic Issues,” Center on International Cooperation, issue paper no. 4, p. 5.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.